Max Weber in 1905 claimed that Protestantism, and more specifically Calvinism, facilitated the rise of modern capitalism. This paper assesses the quantitative plausibility of his hypothesis by introducing religious beliefs into a dynamic general equilibrium model of development and growth. Through counterfactual exercises, the paper investigates whether differences between Catholics and Protestants can account for long delays in the start of industrialization. The main finding is that they cannot. Differences in religions that primarily affect capital accumulation and work effort account for only a 35-year delay in the start of industrialization.
Introduction
Max Weber in 1905 claimed that Protestantism, and more specifically Calvinism, facilitated the rise of modern capitalism. This paper assesses the quantitative plausibility of his hypothesis by introducing religious beliefs into a dynamic general equilibrium model of development and growth. Through counterfactual exercises, the paper investigates whether differences between Catholics and Protestants can account for long delays in the start of industrialization. The main finding is that they cannot. Differences in religions that primarily affect capital accumulation and work effort account for only a 35-year delay in the start of industrialization.
Our motivation for undertaking these exercises is twofold. First, the idea that an individual's religious beliefs affect his economic actions is almost axiomatic. Weber started his thesis by making this same point: " (T)hough the development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational technique and law, it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical rational conduct" and that "The magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duties based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important formative influences on conduct" (Weber (1958 (Weber ( [1905 ), p.26). Presumably, different religious beliefs affect various aspects of human conduct differently, a point shown by Guiso, et al. (2003) [9] and reviewed by Iannaccone (1998) [12] .
In light of the above discussion, we introduce religious beliefs via a subjective probability of reaching heaven or hell in the afterlife. We do this within the framework of an overlapping generations model augmented with an additional period, which we label the afterlife.
3 For
Protestants, the subjective probability of reaching Heaven is assumed to be increasing in the wealth an individual accumulates during his lifetime. For Catholics, the opposite is true.
The wealth an individual accumulates during his lifetime depends directly on his saving decision, (thrift), and indirectly on his labor supply decision, (work effort).
The development model we use is that of Hansen and Prescott (2002) [11] . That model associates the start of an industrial revolution with the date on which an economy switches from a Malthusian production technology with a fixed factor of production, land, to a Solow production technology, with no fixed factors of production. That model has been shown both by Ngai (1999) [18] and Parente and Prescott (forthcoming) [20] to successfully account for the evolution of international income levels since 1750.
Essentially, we follow their approach, but instead of assuming countries differ historically in secular policies, we assume that countries differ historically in their religious beliefs. We calibrate the model to the development experience of England over the 1600-2000 period assuming the Protestant belief established itself there in 1645. The counterfactual exercise we undertake is to suppose that England had stayed a Catholic country after 1645, and to determine how much, if it all, its industrial revolution would have been delayed. We find that Catholicism might have delayed the start of the Industrial Revolution in England by 35 years.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy. Section 3 defines and characterizes the competitive equilibrium path. Section 4 calibrates the model and quantifies the effect of religious differences on the start of the industrial revolution.
Section 5 proceeds with a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model Economy
The economy is populated by overlapping generations, each of which lives two periods. There is a single production commodity that can be used for both consumption and investment purposes. This good can be produced with either a traditional technology or a modern technology. Only the traditional technology uses a fixed factor, land. Both technologies exhibit constant returns to scale and are subject to exogenous technological change. Firms purchase labor services from young agents and capital and rental services from old agents.
When young, an individual earns labor income and accumulates assets both in the form of land and capital. The utility of an individual not only depends on the consumption he enjoys when young and old, but also on his religious beliefs concerning the afterlife. An agent's religion determines whether the probability he assigns to going to heaven in the afterlife increases or decreases in his worldly achievements. We now describe in more detail the structure of the economy.
Technology
The composite good can be produced with either of two technologies- 
The total factor productivity (TFP) of the Malthus technology, A Mt , and the total factor productivity of the Solow technology, A St , evolve according to the following laws of motion:
Endowments
Households live for two periods. When young, each household is endowed with one unit of time. Additionally, the initial old are each endowed with k 1 units of capital, and l 1 units of land. The total endowment of land in the economy is normalized to 1. Land does not depreciate. Capital, in contrast, depreciates fully, as the empirical counterpart of a model period is 35 years.
Preferences
The utility of a household depends on both the consumption and leisure he enjoys while alive, and the state he expects to realize in the afterlife.
This Life
During its lifetime a household derives utility from consumption when young and when old, and leisure when young. Let c 1t denote the consumption of the household born at time t when young, c 2t his consumption when old, and 1 − h t his leisure when young. We introduce leisure into the household's utility to allow for the possibility that differences in religious beliefs have an impact on the hours the young household works. Households discount the future with subjective discount factor β.
The Afterlife
A household is either Catholic or Protestant in its beliefs. Both Protestant and Catholic households believe in the existence of an afterlife, and associate a value of utility to ending up in the good state, heaven, and a value of utility to ending up in the bad state, hell. 4 For simplicity, we assume that both religions assign the same utility value to going to heaven and the same utility value to going to hell. We denote the utility of going to heaven by V H , the utility of going to hell by V H , and their difference by V , (i.e.,
Differences in the two religions manifest themselves in the likelihoods households assign to achieving the good and bad states. Following Weber (1905), we assume that Catholics believe that economic achievement during one's lifetime decreases the probability of going to heaven whereas Protestants believe the opposite. Let x t denote a household's economic achievement in his lifetime relative to the economic achievement of the previous generation, and let Catholic and Protestant subjective beliefs be given by the functions π C (x) and π P (x). 5 The main difference then between the two religions is that dπ C (x)/dx ≤ 0 and
The following functional forms are chosen for computational convenience:
To guarantee an interior solution to the household's problem, we impose two restrictions 4 We do not consider the possibility that there is a third state, limbus, or that households can move between states in the afterlife. 5 The relative measurement is adopted in order to avoid the eventuality that all households expect to go to hell as an economy develops.
on religious parameters, α and V : (1) αV < 1/β; (2) α > 0 but sufficiently small so that 0 < α ln x < 1 at any period.
Total Utility
The expected discounted utility of a young household of religion i born at date t is
Demographics
Let N t denote the number of households born in period t. At t = 1, there are N 0 number of old households and N 1 number of young households alive. Population growth between periods t and t + 1 is a function of the average consumption of young agents in the economy in period t. Let g denote this function, then
Population growth in this model reflects the choice of society, rather than individual households. 6 For this reason, a young household does not take into account the effect of its consumption choice on population. For this reason too, societies can differ along this dimension, possibly because of the religions followed by the majority of their populations.
Competitive Equilibrium

Profit Maximization
The profit maximization problem of a firm that uses either the Malthusian technology or the Solow technology is static. Neither capital nor labor is technology specific. Thus, the rental prices of capital and labor faced by a firm do not depend on the technology it uses. Let w t be the rental price of land, r Kt be the rental price of capital, and r Lt be the rental price of land at date t. The problem of the stand in firm that uses the Malthusian technology is
and the problem of the stand in firm that uses the Solow technology is max
Because land is supplied inelastically in the economy and is not used in the Solow technology, the Malthusian technology will be operated in all periods. Profit maximization implies that
The Solow technology, in contrast, need not be used in a given period. The Solow technology will not be used if the profits associated with operating that technology are negative. Profits are negative if and only if
Equation (10) states that when TFP of the Solow technology is too low, the unit cost of producing the composite good using the Solow technology exceeds one, thereby implying negative profits. The period when the Solow technology is first operated is called the takeoff date. After the take-off date, profit maximization of the stand in firm using the Solow technology implies the following:
Utility Maximization
Given the endowment pattern, a young household's sole source of income is his labor earn-
ings. An old household, in contrast, derives income from renting the capital and land he accumulated when young. Additionally, an old household derives income from selling his land holdings.
Old Alive at date 1
The old alive at date t = 1 have no decisions to make. They simply consume their entire income. The budget constraint of the initial old is 
Young Date t Generation
Let a t denote the value of wealth accumulated by a household born in period t, namely,
and define the household's relative economic achievement as
A young household born at date t chooses a vector (c 1t , c 2t , h t , k t+1 , l t+1 , a t , x t ) to maximize equation (5) subject to budget constraints (13) and (14), and subject to wealth equations (15) and (16) . Because a t equals c 2t , we restrict αV < 1/β so that the effect of an increase in c 2t on expected utility is positive for a person with Catholic beliefs.
The following no-arbitrage condition ensures that households will hold both capital and land in the equilibrium,
Our preference specification allows us to derive a closed form interior solution to the household's problem. Under the restrictions imposed on parameters α and V , the optimal choice of a young household of either religion is such that the probability of going to heaven and the probability of going to hell are both non-zero in all periods. Let β i denote the modified discount factor of a household with belief i ∈ {C, P }. Define β C ≡ β − β 2 αV and
The utility maximizing consumption and leisure allocations of a household born in date t with belief i must satisfy
Equation (18) implies that the savings rate of the young household of religion i is constant and equal to β i 1+β i . Equation (20) shows that the numbers of hours worked by each young household does not vary over time. Clearly, a Protestant is more thrifty compared to a Catholic, as the former saves a larger proportion of his labor income. A Protestant also has a greater work effort compared to a Catholic as the former works more hours when young.
Market Clearing
There are five markets in each period: the goods market, the labor market, the capital market, the land rental market, and the real estate market. The following 5 equations are the associated market clearing conditions:
Definition of a Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in which the economy starts out specializing in the Malthusian technology is a consumption of the initial old, c 20 , a sequence of young household choices,
, a sequence of choices for firms using the Malthusian tech-
, a sequence of choices for firms using the Solow technology,
, and a take-off date t * > 1 that satisfy i. profit maximization (a) for t < t * , equations (7)- (9) and (10).
(b) for t ≥ t * , equations (7)- (9), (11 )- (12), and (10) with equality.
ii. utility maximization (a) for all t > 1, equations (18)- (20).
(b) the budget constraint of the old alive at date 1.
iii. market clearing equations (21)- (25) 
Properties of the Equilibrium
The qualitative properties of the model are the same as in Hansen and Prescott (2002) ; the addition of religious beliefs does not change the nature of the equilibrium path. The economy will start out specializing in the Malthusian technology, provided a sufficiently small initial TFP in the Solow technology, A S1 . As long as γ S > 0, the Solow technology will come to be used at some date, after which, sustained growth in per capita output occurs. Provided that the population growth function g(c 1t ) is a constant for sufficiently large values of c 1t , the economy will converge to the balanced growth path of the standard Solow model with a constant growth rate of per capita output equal to (1+γ S ) 1/(1−θ) . Asymptotically, economies with different religious beliefs, therefore, will grow at the same rate.
Differences in religious beliefs will work to affect the dates at which economies start to experience sustained growth in output per capita through thrift and work effort. By assumption, TFP in the Solow technology does not vary across countries. Consequently, it follows from equation (10) that any difference in take-off dates is attributed to differences in rental prices, which are affected by the economy's capital and labor inputs. More capital (thrift) and more labor (work ethic) will both accelerate the take-off date, as they reduce the wage rate and interest rate in the economy, thereby reducing the unit cost of production using the Solow technology.
From equation (20) , one can see that the labor input in a Protestant economy is higher than the labor input in a Catholic economy, and from equation (18), one can see that the savings rate of the young is also higher in a Protestant economy. The latter suggests that the Protestant economy has a higher capital stock at any given date. 7 These factors imply that a Protestant economy will start the development process before a Catholic economy.
The key question is whether differences in religious beliefs are quantitatively important.
Computation
Calibration
The quantitative importance of religious beliefs for development and growth is determined by parameterizing the model and comparing the computed equilibrium paths for Catholic and Protestant economies. The question we precisely answer in this experiment is how much later would the Industrial Revolution have started in England if it had not undergone the Protestant Reformation and continued as an essentially Catholic nation.
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The calibration is based on an interpretation that pre-1645 England was a Catholic nation on a Malthusian steady state and post-1645 England was a Protestant nation. 9 Additionally, the calibration is based on a 1750 starting date for the Industrial Revolution in England.
Lastly, the calibration is based on an interpretation that post-1850 England was close to or on a Solow balanced growth path.
Accordingly, period 1 in the model corresponds to the year 1645, the date of the Protestant Reformation in England. Without loss of generality, the initial population of the young, households also save in the form of land. 8 We make no claim that the difference between Protestants and Catholics isolated in this paper exists today. For this reason our analysis focuses on delays in the start of the development process, rather than current differences in income levels. 11 The capital share observation parameter is actually based on postwar US data. However, capital's share has been shown by Gollin (2002) [8] to be roughly constant across countries.
The product of religious parameters, αV , as well as preference parameters, β and η, are
= post-1850 capital-output ratio. 
Development Path of Protestant England
We, like Hansen and Prescott (2002) find that the equilibrium path is quantitatively consistent with England's development experience; the introduction of leisure and religious beliefs to the household's preferences does not change the quantitative properties of the development and growth path either.
14 The industrial revolution, namely, the transition from Malthus to Solow takes a long period of time to complete; nearly 105 years elapse before 95 percent of the economy's output is produced with the Solow technology. (Figure 2(b) ). Prior to 1750, the growth rate of per capita is low and irregular, but thereafter increases dramatically 14 The equilibrium path is computed using the shooting algorithm described in Hansen and Prescott (2002) . (Figure 3(a) ), and declining land's share of wealth (Figure 3(b) ). The annual interest rate implied by the model is constant after 1850, a prediction which is consistent with the historical record (Figure 3(c) ). Prior to 1850, the interest rate declines before slightly rising. The initial decline is the result of the assumption that the economy starts with a steady-state capital stock associated with a Catholic Malthusian steady state. The model also predicts an increase in the rental price of land until 1785 followed by a decline ( Figure   3(d) ). The increase prior to 1785 his consistent with data compiled by Clark (1998) [5] for
England. The subsequent drastic decline in the rental price of land is not, however.
Delays in Development
To quantify the effect of religion on development, we compute the development path for a Catholic economy with the same initial conditions and compare it to the development path of the Protestant economy computed in the previous subsection. We emphasize that and interest rates are clearly lower in the Catholic economy. After 1850, the capital to output ratio is roughly 5 times greater in the Protestant country and the interest is more than 2 times greater in the Catholic country. These differences reflect the fact that saving is the main channel through which religion affects development in the model. The greater savings rate by young households in the Protestant economy also implies a much higher value of 
Sensitivity
We now examine whether our findings are sensitive to the observations used to calibrate the model. The sensitivity analysis focuses on three sets of observations: the labor inputs, the capital to output ratio, and capital's share. We focus on these observations because measurement errors are very likely. Additionally, these are observations that are critical in determining the values of the religious belief parameters, which are the essence of the paper and which we have no independent information. We find that our results are robust to possible measurement problems associated with these observations.
Labor Inputs
We have two concerns with respect to the accuracy of the labor-input observations used in the baseline calibration. First, the Clark and von der Werf (1998) estimates of labor inputs are measured in days worked per year rather than total hours. In the baseline case, we did not adjust for the fact that the number of hours worked per day is far smaller than 24. This suggests that the true difference in labor inputs in the pre-1645 period and the post-1850 period may be smaller than the baseline case. Second, the Clark and von der Werf labor input numbers are based on observations in the agriculture sector only. Voth (1998) [23] suggests there was a more significant increase in work days outside of the primary sector in the eighteenth century England. Whereas the Clark and von der Werf estimates imply a 1.13 factor difference in labor inputs between the two periods, the Voth estimates imply a On account of these concerns, we recalibrate the model using the smaller historical differences associated with adjusting the Clark and von der Werf (1998) workday numbers, and using the larger historical differences estimated by Voth (1998) . We adjust the Clark and von der Werf (1998) numbers to reflect an 11 hour workday, which is the length of the workday Voth (1998) estimates from court records for eighteenth century London. As figure   6 (a) shows, the difference in the take-off dates between Catholic and Protestant economies disappears with the adjusted Clark and von der Werf labor inputs. The effect is smaller, as the calibrated parameter value of α · V is smaller due to the smaller difference in hours worked between Catholic and Protestant households. The re-calibration to the Voth (1998) estimates does not alter our findings. As figure 6 (b) shows, the difference in take-off dates between Protestant and Catholic economies is still 35 years. We conclude from these exercises that our results are robust to labor inputs being poorly measured. 
Capital to Output Ratios
There are discrepancies concerning historical estimates of the capital to output ratios for Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show that the difference in take-off dates decreases as the capital to output ratio is increased. The capital to output ratio has important consequences for the value of the subjective discount factor, β, with a higher capital to output ratio implying a higher value for β. At the same time, a higher value for β requires a lower value for αV in order to match the labor input observations. Consequently, a higher capital to output ratio has the effect of diminishing the importance of religious beliefs, αV . This explains why the effect of religion on take-off dates is smaller when a higher capital to output ratio is used in the calibration.
Lowering the capital-output ratio, thus, would seem like a potential way to increase the delay in industrialization. However, it is not possible to lower the capital to output ratio much below 2.25, as the condition for an interior solution to a Catholic household's maximization problem, namely, βαV < 1, would be violated. A ratio of 2.25 is, thus, the approximate lower bound on the set of feasible capital to output ratios. Consequently, the 70 year delay shown in figure 7(a) represents an upper bound to the effect of religious beliefs on industrialization, and even this may be too generous, as the implied annual rate of interest in the Catholic economy is 13 percent.
Capital's Share
The capital share parameter value, θ, in the Solow technology used in the calibration was taken from Hansen and Prescott (2002) . They derive this value by computing the income paid to physical capital in the national accounts. A major line of research in the development and growth literature argues that other forms of capital, namely, human and organizational capital, are also important inputs in the production of goods and services. When capital is broadly defined to include both physical and intangible capital, its importance in production increases, as reflected by a larger coefficient on the capital input in the production function.
Parente and Prescott (2000) [19] , for instance, suggest that the share value for this broad capital stock could be as high as .60.
In light of this possibility, we recalibrate the model economy to a higher capital share. Figure 8 shows the difference in take-off dates between the Protestant and Catholic economies -Catholic --Protestant for a capital share of .50 and 0.60. 15 As can be seen, our finding is robust to the possibility that a large amount of capital in the economy goes unmeasured. The difference in take-off dates does not change as the capital share parameter increases. The main effect is to increase the length of time it takes to complete the transition for both economies.
Conclusion
This paper finds that differences in the way Catholics and Protestants viewed worldly achievements are not quantitatively important in understanding why some countries started to develop much later than others. In a certain sense, the finding is not surprising. Religion in our model primarily works to affect the start of economic development through an economy's savings rate and time input. Works by Hall and Jones (1999) [10] and Klenow and 15 In re-calibrating to these higher share values, the value of A S1 is reset to ensure that the Protestant economy begins to industrialize in 1750
Rodriguez-Claire (1997) [14] have found that differences in savings rates and efficiency units of labor only account for a small fraction of current international income differences. These studies as well as others conclude that most of the differences in international income levels is attributed to differences in total factor productivity.
It may be that the effect of Protestantism was to increase total factor productivity in pre-Industrial England. There is some empirical support for this idea. Guiso et al. (2003) find that current-day Protestants trust others and the legal system more than Catholics and that they are less willing to cheat on taxes and accept bribes. Interestingly, they also find that Catholics are more in favor of competition and private ownership than Protestants, but that Protestants are less willing to sacrifice incentives for equality. Perhaps, Weber himself realized the need for a theory of TFP based on religions when he wrote at the end of his thesis:
... next task would be rather to show the significance of ascetic rationalism, which has only been touched in the foregoing sketch, for the content of practical social ethics, thus for the types of organization and the functions of social groups from the conventicle to the State. Then its relation to humanistic rationalism, its ideals of life and cultural influence; further to the development of philosophical and scientific empiricism, to technical development and to spiritual ideals would have to be analyzed. Only then could the quantitative cultural significance of ascetic Protestantism in its relation to the other plastic elements of modern culture be estimated. Weber (1958 Weber ( [1905 ), p.182.
